In the Operations Research queue-joining literature, beginning with Naor (1969), the queue joining probability is monotonic decreasing in the queue length; the longer the queue, the fewer consumers join. Recent academic and empirical evidence indicates that queue-joining probabilities may not always be decreasing in the queue length. We provide a simple explanation for these non-monotonic queue-joining strategies by relaxing the informational assumptions in Naor's model. Instead of imposing that the expected service time and service value are common knowledge, we assume that they are unknown to consumers, but positively correlated. Under such informational assumptions, the posterior expected waiting cost and service value increase in the observed queue length. As a consequence, we show that queue joining equilibria may emerge for which the joining probability increases locally in the queue length. We refer to these as "sputtering equilibria." We discuss when and why such sputtering equilibria exist for discrete as well as continuously distributed priors on the expected service time (with positively correlated service value).
Introduction
Management of services is fundamentally influenced by how consumers consider congestion or queue lengths in making their joining decisions. Naor (1969) was the first to introduce consumers that make rational queue-joining decisions based on the queue length upon arrival. In Naor's model, the (dominating) equilibrium queue-joining strategy is a threshold strategy: Consumers join the queue if the length of the queue is below a threshold. Above the threshold, waiting costs dominate the service value, and hence consumers balk. Note the threshold decision is an outcome of a comparison between service value and waiting costs, with the latter increasing in queue lengths. As a result, in Naor's seminal model (and in most of the literature), the joining rate is monotonically decreasing in the queue length, fewer consumers join a queue when the queue grows longer. This aspect of the consumer queue-joining research was extensively explored in the book by Hassin and Haviv (2003) .
There is anecdotal and empirical evidence that the rates at which consumers join queues may not be monotonically decreasing in the queue length. This idea is in fact long grounded as folk wisdom in the restaurant industry: "If one walks into a restaurant and there's nobody eating in the establishment already, a consumer is less likely to hang around, regardless of the expected food quality. Conversely, if a consumer walks in and the place is bustling, [he's] probably going to give it a shot" (Waldman, 2009) . The notion of "empty restaurant syndrome"-a restaurant parlance that describes patrons not joining a restaurant when it is empty-also supports this observation.
Recently, a number of research findings support the above mentioned ideas of non-monotonic queuejoining behavior. In an empirical study of queues at a deli, Olivares et al. (2012) find that purchase incidence is non-monotone in queue lengths. Norton (2011a, 2011b) find evidence that consumers can join longer queues with a higher affinity, a behavior that is further strengthened by the imperfect information in consumers' minds. Giebelhausen et al. (2011) , experimentally show that waiting times can indeed be a signal about quality increasing both purchase intentions and experienced satisfaction when quality is important, unknown or ambiguous.
The above observations imply that the joining rate may not always be monotonically decreasing in queue length: At shorter queue lengths, consumers may be more reluctant to join than at longer queue lengths. Such behavior cannot be explained by canonical threshold queue-joining models.
One main question in this research is to explore the antecedents of such non-monotonic queuejoining behavior, especially those factors that are related to uncertainty about the service process characteristics. To elaborate, consumers may not exactly know a firm's expected service time and value ex ante (before joining). In such cases, the consumers' decisions are influenced by uncertainties in service value and cost. We show that a simple relaxation of the information assumptions in Naor's canonical model can result in a non-monotonic queue-joining equilibrium structure.
To be sure, nonthreshold joining strategies have been identified in queuing games with priorities (Hassin and Haviv, 1997) . In our paper, we do not consider priorities. More recent papers (Debo et al., 2011 Veeraraghavan and Debo, 2011 ) study the informational externalities associated with queue-joining decisions under waiting costs. In these papers, such queue-joining strategies emerge due to heterogeneity: Some consumers have better information about the service value than others. In our paper, we consider homogeneously informed consumers.
Instead, we rationalize the non-monotonic queue-joining behavior observed in practice by relax-ing Naor's assumption that the expected service time and value are common knowledge. Thus, our model can be considered as a simple, but theoretically and practically consequential generalization of Naor's seminal queue-joining model. As in Naor's model, arriving consumers must make an instantaneous decision to join or not. 1 We consider a market in which consumers observe the queue length to learn both the value of the service and waiting time (and costs).
When there is uncertainty about the service value and time, the dependencies between service value and service time become relevant. In many services with non-monotonic queue-joining, service value has a positive correlation with service time. For instance, for labor-intensive services, consumers might enjoy an increased utility from longer service times as more care is given during the longer service time. Since longer waiting times in queues are a direct result of longer service times, it can also be construed that the consumers perceive an added utility in joining longer queue lengths. In fact, the non-monotonic queue joining observed by Buell and Norton (2011a) could arise from the labor illusion-a higher value perceived from a higher labor content in the longer wait time. Anand et al. (2011) discuss services in which the offered service value is positively correlated with the wait times and illustrate the market effect of such dependencies. Such observations of service time and value dependencies have now found stronger theoretical and empirical support in various papers. Dai et al. (2011) show that in medical services, the service quality (or value), increases in the diagnostic testing time. We refer the reader to Hopp et al. (2007) , Wang et al. (2009) and Alizamir et al. (2012) for services whose value increases in the service time (discretionary services), to Kostami and Rajagopalan (2009) for dynamic tradeoffs in such services, and to Mold et al. (2010) for informational returns on clinical tests. To summarize, it appears that in many service settings, longer service times are positively correlated with increased service value.
Correlation Structure: Motivated by the above empirical and theoretical observations, we introduce a positive correlation between service time and service value. In principle, there could be negative correlation between unknown expected service time and unknown service value. In the cases with negative correlation, it is intuitive that longer queues imply long waiting and service times, and also low value service. Hence, consumers balk as queue gets longer. In this case, it is easy to demonstrate that Naor's threshold equilibrium is recovered. Therefore, we focus in this paper on the widely prevalent case of positive correlation between expected service time and service value, where the decisions based on service value and waiting time are more subtle. We demonstrate that such positive correlation structure may result in queue-joining strategies that are non-monotonic in the queue length, as is suggested by folk wisdom and as observed empirically.
When there is positive correlation between service value and time, longer queues imply longer service duration and hence higher waiting costs. However, longer service duration also implies a higher expected service value from joining. As a consequence, both the expected cost and value increase as a function of the observed queue length. Pure threshold joining strategies may still emerge, but not necessarily. When no pure threshold joining equilibrium exists, we demonstrate that an equilibrium exists with randomization at one (or more) queue lengths below some threshold.
This creates non-monotonicity in joining behavior-a consumer joins with a probability strictly less than one at a lower queue length, but may join with probability one at a higher queue length.
We label the underlying equilibria that generate such non-monotone queue joining behavior, as sputtering equilibria.
Thus, our analysis simply illustrates that a relaxation of the informational assumptions in Naor's model in two fundamental parameters -the expected service time and service value -provides an explanation for the real-world non-monotonic queue-joining behavior.
Our model also allows assessing the impact of unknown service value and time on the service firm's revenue. The randomization through sputtering equilibria is relevant for service firms that provide high value (at the expense of longer service times) because it may adversely affect the firm's throughput and revenue. We show that the unobservability of the expected service time and value can either increase or decrease the throughput of a firm.
A summary of our theoretical findings follows.
1. We show that pure threshold equilibria exist when the gap in service value between the shortest and the longest time is sufficiently small, and the prior is bivalued. When this gap is large, it is possible that no pure threshold joining strategy exists.
2. When no pure threshold joining equilibria exist, we show that a sputtering equilibrium always exists when the prior is bivalued. Under such sputtering equilibria, the consumers randomize between joining and balking at a lower queue length, and strictly join at higher queue lengths.
3. We show that sputtering equilibria result in non-monotone queue joining behavior. We demonstrate that sputtering equilibria persist, even when the other equilibria (associated with monotone queue-joining) do not exist.
4. Sputtering equilibria exist even when the prior beliefs are continuously distributed. We find that when the prior beliefs have a continuous distribution, there could be sputtering at multiple queue lengths. Finally, we characterize the prior beliefs that could generate a specific sputtering equilibrium.
A Queuing Model with Unknown Service Parameters
Consumers arrive sequentially at a single server market according to a Poisson process with parameter Λ and decide whether to join (i.e. acquire the service) or balk (i.e. not to join). If the arriving consumers that want to join cannot be immediately served, they wait and form a queue.
The queue discipline is first come, first served. All consumers incur a disutility of c > 0 per unit time while waiting to complete the service. Service times are exponentially distributed. The mean service time and service value are unknown to the consumers.
In this section, we model this uncertainty by assuming that the expected service time is an outcome of a bi-valued random variable; the expected service time is either long,τ , with probability p, or short, τ , with probability 1 − p. (We analyze continuous prior extension in Section 4). The service value, V (τ ), is a linear function of the expected service time; V (τ ) = V 0 + rτ , where r > 0.
This condition implies that a service that takes more time on average is associated with a higher value. In section 4, we extend our analysis to the case in which the expected service time is a continuous random variable with support in [τ ,τ ] . The net utility of joining at queue length n is V 0 + {r − c(n + 1)}τ due to congestion costs that are linear in the expected service time.
Assumption 1. We assume that:
Assumption 1 accommodates negative net utilities when not enough time is spent on service, even when the queue is empty upon arrival, V 0 + (r − c)τ < 0. When the system is empty, and the service time is known to be τ , the service value is less than the expected waiting cost, hence, no consumer would join. When the service time isτ and the system is empty, the service is valuable enough that its value exceeds the expected waiting cost. LetN = ⌊(V 0 + rτ )/(cτ )⌋ where ⌊x⌋ is the floor of any positive real x. With Assumption 1,N 1.N is the lowest queue length at which the expected waiting time is higher than the service value atτ . Hence, when the consumers know that the expected service time isτ , they join at all queue lengths in {0, 1, . . . ,N − 1} and balk at N . With r > c in Assumption 1, V (τ ) − c(n + 1)τ increases in the expected service time for all queue lengths in {0, 1, . . . ,N }. The model primitives are (Λ, V 0 , r, c, p) .
Game: First, Nature determines the mean service time, τ ∈ {τ ,τ }, and therefore the corresponding value, V 0 + rτ . Then, consumers arrive and observe the queue length, n, based on which they decide whether to join the queue or balk. The consumers maximize their expected net utility (i.e., service value minus the expected waiting costs). After joining, the consumers stay in the system until their service is completed. As in Naor's model, there is no reneging.
The consumer strategies and beliefs: We can restrict the relevant queue lengths to {0, 1, . . . ,N }, whereN is the highest balking threshold for all τ ∈ {τ ,τ }. We denote the consumer probability of joining the service after observing the queue length n ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N } by α n , i.e., . . . ,N }→[0, 1] . The consumer's updated probability that the expected service time is long and the corresponding service value is high, after observing a queue of length n is denoted . . . ,N }→[0, 1] . In short, the vectors α = (α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , . . . , αN ) and γ = (γ 0 , γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γN ) denote the consumer's joining strategy and the consumer's updated belief, respectively.
If there is one queue length (say k) at which no consumer joins, none of the queue lengths that are strictly higher than k will have a strictly positive long-run probability. Thus, it is sufficient to focus our analysis to the joining strategies of the form α = (α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α k−1 , 0, . . . , 0), where k N (that is: balking at k) where α n > 0 for 0 n < k. We need to determine the equilibrium strategies of all consumers: α * and γ * . We specify those equilibrium conditions in the following subsection.
Description of Queue-Joining Equilibrium Conditions
Consider a randomly arriving consumer. Suppose all other consumers join according to some strategy α. The consumer's expected utility of joining the queue, denoted by u (n, γ), is a function of the queue length upon arrival, n and her belief about the server's type, γ. The expected utility of balking is normalized to zero. 
Definition 1 (Equilibrium
(ii) The consumer beliefs are consistent: The belief γ * n satisfies Bayes' rule on all queue lengths that are reached with strictly positive probability in the long run under the strategy α * . 2 Condition (i) of Definition 1 is referred to as the rationality condition for the consumers. Condition (ii) of Definition 1 is referred to as the consistency condition of the beliefs. Using the conditions, we can now analyze the queue-joining equilibrium.
For a given belief, γ, an arriving consumer's expected utility after observing n consumers in the system can be written as
With Equation (3), we write condition (i) of Definition 1 for consumers: α n is 1 (0) when u (n, γ) > 0 (u (n, γ) < 0) and α n takes any value in [0, 1] when u (n, γ) = 0.
Condition (ii) of Definition 1 needs to be imposed on γ n . To that end, let π n (α, τ ) be the long-run probability that n consumers are in the system when the consumer strategy is α and the server's mean service time is τ . For a given mean service time and consumer joining strategy, the stochastic process that describes the queue length is a birth-and-death process (Ross, 1996) , which allows us to characterize the long-run probability distribution.
Suppose that consumers follow the strategy profile α. Then the stationary probability of a queue of length n, π n (α, τ ), is
From PASTA property (Wolff, 1982) , π n (α, τ ) is also the probability that a randomly arriving consumer observes n consumers in the system. Condition (ii) of Definition 1 imposes that the posterior density of the service time and value after observing a queue length of n (on the equilibrium path) satisfies Bayes' rule:
We can write the utility, u(n, γ), when beliefs γ of Equation (5) is substituted in Equation (3) as a function of strategies α, U (n, α):
We obtain an equilibrium condition expressed uniquely in terms of α * :
Note that the (equilibrium) conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 1 are met by any α * that satisfies Equation (7) and γ * that results from the long-run probability distributions characterized by Equation (4). Since the action space is compact ([0, 1]N ) and the best response function has a closed graph, with the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, we can conclude that at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies exists.
Equilibrium Analysis: Pure and Sputtering Equilibria
Roadmap of our Analysis: In this section, we identify and characterize the equilibrium structures for the binary prior case. In section 3.1, we first identify the sufficient conditions for a threshold joining equilibrium strategy (also known as pure or classical mixed strategy equilibrium). In cases when these classical threshold strategies do not exist, we identify (in section 3.2) non-threshold (sputtering) equilibrium strategies, with randomization at a single queue length that is strictly be-low the balking threshold. In section 3.3, through a focal analysis on a class of sputtering equilibria with randomization at the empty queue, we demonstrate that the sputtering equilibria continue to persist. Thus, non-monotone threshold strategies that emerge sputtering equilibrium are quite pronounced. Further, we demonstrate that other mixed strategy equilibria with randomization at multiple queue lengths, are knife-edge cases that disappear, when the exogenous parameters are perturbed. Finally, we conclude in section 3.4, by discussing the impact of unknown expected service time and value on the equilibrium throughput.
Pure threshold joining strategies
We first analyze strategies of the form α = (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), where consumers always join at the first k queue-lengths. We begin the indices in α at queue length 0. Thus, the joining probability at queue length n is given by α n , which is the n + 1 th component of α. Therefore, a threshold joining strategy α is characterized by means of a single parameter k, which is the balking threshold.
With a slight abuse of notation, we write U (n, α) as simply U (n, k).
Recall that a threshold strategy, according to Equation (7), is an equilibrium characterized by k, in which the following conditions are satisfied: U (n, k) 0 for 0 n k − 1 and U (n, k) 0 for n k. We rewrite the condition U (n, k) > 0 in terms of two separate functions φ(n) and Φ(k):
We can consider φ(n) and Φ(k) as a function over reals. In that case, we replace the integer n by the realñ and the integer k by the realk to obtain the functions φ(ñ) and Φ(k). We specify the domain
Notice from the left-hand side of the Equation (8) 
and limñ →n − φ(ñ) = +∞. Also note that the set [n,n) is nonempty due to Assumption (1) and n < 0 <n, hence, we consider [n,n) as the domain of φ(ñ). It is easy to see that Φ(k) is non-negative for allk 0, hence, R + is the domain of Φ(k). With φ(ñ) and Φ(k) defined, for a givenk, define:
Typically, N (k) reveals further information about the consumer equilibrium. Note that for expository convenience we do not restrict the domain of N (k) to [0, k] . 3 Then, for some threshold joining strategy characterized by k, max{0, ⌈N (k)⌉} = m, (where ⌈x⌉ is the largest integer not greater than x ∈ R + ) is thus the lowest queue length at which φ(m) < p 1−p Φ(k), i.e., with Equation (8), the queue length at which the consumer's utility is negative, hence, she balks. Then
can be interpreted as the "Best Response" of a focal consumer when all other consumers join according to a pure threshold strategy at k ∈ N. The rational focal consumer joins according to a pure threshold strategy with her threshold at max{0, ⌈N (k)⌉}. A threshold strategy of a focal consumer is an equilibrium strategy if her best response coincides with the strategy of all other consumers. Thus, the equilibrium condition for a strategy with a threshold atk is
Example 1: We now provide an illustrative example when a threshold joining strategy may not be an equilibrium. Let V 0 = −7.55, r = 12.025, c = 1, τ = 0.65,τ = 1.55 and Λ = 1. In Figure 1 , we plot the Best Response function for two examples. In the left panel, we have the prior p = 0.8, which is high. In the right panel, the prior is p = 0.2. The best response function is indicated by the crosses ("+"). When the Best Response function intersects with the 45 degree line ("⋄"), we obtain a pure strategy threshold equilibrium.
In the left panel, the prior p = 0.8, and the best response to any threshold joining strategy, k, is to balk at a queue length of 7. Therefore, there is a threshold equilibrium strategy in which all consumers balk at queue length k = 7 or higher. On other hand, in the right panel, with p = 0.2, the Best Response to a threshold joining strategy of k = 3 is to balk at a queue length of 6. Recall the discussion pursuant to Equation (9). Similarly, the Best Response to a threshold joining strategy of k = 4 is to balk at a queue length of 1. Hence, in this case, there cannot be a pure threshold joining strategy.
In Example 1, we have provided an instance in which a pure threshold strategy equilibrium is absent. Using the illustrated example, our next step is to clarify theoretically how threshold equilibrium strategies may fail to exist. We now analyze the properties of Φ(k) and φ(n) to decipher the equilibrium structure.
Φ(k): With a slight abuse of notation, let π j (k, τ ) be the long-run probability that the queue length is j when all consumers join according to a threshold k and the expected service time is τ . This results in an M/M/1/k queue with a service rate of 1/τ . We can see that Φ(k) =
. Φ(k) can thus be described as the likelihood ratio of the server being fast to the server being slow when the queue is empty.
The interpretation of φ (n) is more subtle. Note that the likelihood ratio of the queue being n is given by
assuming that between queue lengths 0 and n − 1, all consumers join). Hence, when
, the consumer arriving at queue length n is indifferent between joining and balking, if the posterior likelihood ratio at the empty queue were φ (n). Therefore, φ (n) can be interpreted as the required likelihood ratio at the empty queue that makes an arriving consumer indifferent between joining and not at queue length n.
In the Proposition 2 that follows, we will show φ(n) will not be monotonic, unlike Φ(k). The non-monotonic nature of φ(n) will cause the sputtering equilibrium, i.e., the non-monotone queue joining probability as a function of the queue length. We characterize the properties of Φ(k) and
When C < 0, φ(ñ) attains a local maximum followed by a local minimum over [n,n).
We now provide some intuition for the Proposition 2. In Proposition 2(i), Φ(k) is decreasing in k. Recall that Φ(k) is the likelihood ratio of the server being fast to the server being slow, at the observation of an empty queue, when the balking threshold is k. Suppose that the balking threshold k is very low; In this case, the recurrent state space (queue lengths) is small. In the extreme case of k = 0 (when all customers balk at the empty queue), the queue is always empty, irrespective of the expected service time, and hence Φ(0) = 1. A higher joining threshold increases the recurrent set of queue lengths. Since the queues deplete quicker with a faster server, an arriving consumer is more likely to observe an empty queue at a faster server, i.e., for k > 0, Φ(k) < 1(= Φ(0)).
When the balking threshold is higher, the queue is even less likely to be empty at the fast server.
Therefore, Φ(k) decreases in k.
Examining Proposition 2(ii), it is interesting to observe φ(ñ) is not always monotonic. Depending on the nature of the curve, we end up with different equilibrium structures. Proposition 2(ii) provides a sufficient condition for the monotonicity of φ(ñ), under which a unique root, N (k), of 
An illustration of C:
The condition C > 0 is illustrated in Figure 2 . The diagonal line is τ =τ .
Sinceτ > τ , we need to focus only on the upper triangle. Asτ V (τ ) > τ V (τ ), notice that C > 0 whenτ is sufficiently close to τ , and c is high. In that case, the logarithm in the expression is close to zero. When the two service-time priors are close enough to each other, a threshold strategy equilibrium emerges (as we observed in the left panel of Figure 1 where the gap between τ and τ was small). Thus, the threshold equilibrium naturally emerges under little or no uncertainty in the service times, making Naor's threshold result a special case. Whenτ is much higher than τ , C becomes negative, a threshold strategy equilibrium may not exist. Therefore, we have:
is monotonically increasing in n. As Φ(k) is monotonically decreasing in k, there always exists a k at which Φ(k) first drops below φ(n). In the next subsection (in Proposition 3(i)), we will show that a pure a threshold equilibrium exists, either with balking atk or with mixing atk −1 and balking atk. We refer to this as the classical mixed threshold equilibrium 4 .
2. When C < 0, φ(n) may not be monotonic in n, and therefore a pure or a classical mixed threshold strategy equilibrium cannot be guaranteed. Nevertheless, in the next subsection (in Proposition 3(ii)) we will show that there always exists an equilibrium with balking atk and mixing at k k − 1. When k <k − 1, we refer to this as the sputtering equilibrium.
Thus, although a monotonic queue joining strategy may not exist, we can always guarantee a sputtering equilibrium strategy. Following this outline, in the next subsection, we characterize a sputtering strategy with randomization, in those scenarios where a threshold strategy does not exist.
Sputtering Equilibrium Strategies
In this section, we analyze two cases in which there exist no pure threshold strategy equilibria.
In the first case, when C > 0, φ(n) is monotonically increasing in n and Φ(k) is decreasing in k.
In Proposition 3, for this case, we construct an equilibrium having randomization with probability αk −1 atk − 1 and balking atk. This corresponds to a classical queue joining equilibrium: pure if
However, in the second case, φ(n) is non-monotonic, and there may exist a k such that ⌈N (k)⌉ > k and ⌈N (k + 1)⌉ < k + 1. Then, the Best Response function will not intersect with the 45-degree line. In Proposition 3(ii), we construct a sputtering equilibrium that allows randomization with probability α k at some k and balking at somek k + 1, with the possibility thatk > k + 1. Note this is a sputtering equilibrium: At k, the queue sputters before increasing tok due to the mixing probability of α k at k. For convenience of notation, we will sometimes use α as a shortcut for α k ,
i.e. the randomization probability at queue length k. In other words, even though consumers may balk (by randomizing) at queue length k, they join with probability 1 when the queue length is k + 1 (or higher). For developing the next proposition, we definê
Φ denotes the likelihood ratio at the empty queue when consumers join according to a sputtering strategy characterized by (k, α,k 
The equilibrium is also a pure strategy when
The obtained α * is such that {U (n, α * ) 0 for 0 n <k − 1;
(ii) [Sputtering Equilibrium] When C < 0, either there exists a pure threshold joining strategy equilibrium, or a sputtering equilibrium with joining strategy
having randomization with probability α at k and balking atk, wherek k + 1. k is the local maximum of φ(n) andk is the lowest integer n(> k), satisfying: φ(n) φ(k) and α satisfies:
In the sputtering equilibrium, consumer strategy is pure joining for all queue lengths less than k, randomization with α at queue length k, pure joining thereafter, and balking atk where k + 1 <k.
The equilibrium belief, γ * , follows immediately from the long-run probability distributions.
Example 1 (contd.): Continuing with Example 1 (right panel) for which we did not have a pure threshold joining strategy, we now illustrate the sputtering equilibrium. We identify a nonthreshold equilibrium with k = 1, α(= α 1 ) = 0.1695 andk = 6. Under this equilibrium, all consumers always join the queue when its length is strictly less than 1, they join with probability 0.1695 (or balk with probability 0.8305) when the queue length is 1, and they always join when the queue length is between 2 and 5, and finally, they balk from any queue that is 6 or longer.
This instance is demonstrated in Figure 3 , which depicts two curves as functions of n-dotted lines with "⋄"s representing the expected updated service value, and dotted lines with "+" representing the waiting costs. It is clear that the service value matches exactly with waiting costs at the randomization queue length 1. At queue lengths {0, 2, 3, 4, 5}, the expected service value is strictly greater than the expected waiting costs. At n = 6 and higher, the expected waiting costs are greater than the expected service value. Hence, consumers balk.
Sputtering Equilibria: Persistence of Non-monotone queue joining
So far, we have demonstrated the prevalence of non-monotone queue joining strategies that are supported by the existence of sputtering equilibria. At this point, a natural question arises: Can sputtering equilibria exist even when other monotone queue joining structure do not exist? To address this question, we examine a special case of sputtering equilibria which involves randomizing at the empty queue (k = 0), and joining at non-empty queues up to a threshold (k > 1). This is a sputtering equilibrium in which arriving consumers may balk with some probability at an empty queue, but will always join when the queues are longer (unto a thresholdk). The extreme nonmonotone strategy is reminiscent of the 'empty restaurant syndrome' discussed in the introduction.
A significantly appealing property about the existence of this "extreme" sputtering equilibrium is that no other classical mixing equilibrium or pure equilibrium exist in a region in the parameter space where this sputtering equilibrium exists. In Proposition 4 we identify such region.
The existence of a sputtering equilibrium (associated with non-monotone queue joining) and the simultaneous absence of the classical equilibria is striking and persistent. We also introduce 'nonclassical' monotone equilibria with randomization at two or more queue lengths exist. We show in Proposition 5 that equilibria with randomization at four or more queue lengths cannot exist. We show also that equilibria with randomization at two or three queue lengths can exist, but, they are dependent on 'knife-edge' conditions, i.e., these equilibria break down on the slightest perturbation to the parameters. In contrast, sputtering equilibria are persistent. We also provide the rationale behind the persistence of the sputtering equilibria. (ii) no classical pure or mixed strategy equilibrium exists ∀p ∈ (p,p).
Equations (13) and (14) guarantee that k = 0 and thatk > 1 respectively. If the latter condition is not satisfied, the joining probabilities will be monotone; (α 0 , 0, . . .). There is randomization at the empty queue, and balking begins as soon as there is one consumer in the system. Note that both conditions (13) and (14) are independent of the prior about the service value, p. We illustrate in Figure 2 the region in the (τ ,τ )-space in which such "extreme" non-monotone strategy exists.
See the area in northwest corner of Figure 2 within the dashed curves.
Essentially, this extreme sputtering equilibrium occurs, when the low-value service is very fast (τ is small) and the high-value service is significantly slower (i.e.τ /τ is high). Furthermore, from Proposition 4(ii), no classical pure or mixed strategy equilibrium exists when the extreme sputtering equilibrium exists (of course, when there is sufficient uncertainty about the expected service value).
From Figure 2 , the region is significantly large, such that the equilibrium continues to exist in the interior, even if the service times τ andτ are perturbed.
Next, we examine 'non-classical' monotone equilibria with randomization at two or more queue lengths. We show that randomization at three queue lengths may exist, but, disappear upon small perturbations of (τ ,τ ) (i.e. these equilibria are 'knife-edge'). We also show that no equilibria with randomization at four or more queue lengths can exist.
Proposition 5. (i) No equilibrium with randomization at four or more queue lengths exist.
(ii) For given V 0 , r and selectedk 3, there exist a c > 0, such that for c ∈ (0, c), with
chosen such that Proposition 5(i) states that it is impossible that randomization in equilibrium occurs at four or more queue lengths. This is due to the specific non-monotone structure of φ(ñ).
as a generalization ofΦ(k, α,k) and Φ(k) for any joining strategy α. In Proposition 2(ii), we show that φ(ñ) has a local maximum followed by a local minimum over [n,n). As a result, φ(ñ) (over the continuous domain) can intersect with
at not more than three points. Since any any equilibrium strategy, α * , that has randomization between joining and balking at an n necessarily requires
we cannot have an equilibrium strategy that has randomization at four or more queue lengths.
An immediate consequence of the result is that any equilibrium strategy with randomization at multiple queue-lengths is limited to randomization at a maximum of three queue-lengths. To preserve focus, we characterize randomization at three consecutive queue lengths in Proposition 5(ii), followed by balking. 5 In order to obtain such strategies, φ(n) must be 'flat' at three consecutive
can construct an equilibrium with randomization at queue lengths {k − 3,k − 2,k − 1} and joining (balking) at shorter (longer) queue lengths. When the waiting cost is low enough, Equation (15) provides a condition on (τ ,τ ) such that φ(n) is flat over {k − 3,k − 2,k − 1}, for somek. Equation Recall from the definition of φ(ñ) (Equation (8)) that φ(ñ) does not depend on the prior, p.
Therefore, we can always find a prior p such that: (8), these inequalities simply correspond to the expected utility of joining, U (n, α * ), being strictly positive at queue lengths 0 n k −4, equaling zero fork − 3 n k − 1 and being negative for n =k. We demonstrate these characterization using an illustrative Example 2.
Example 2: We let V 0 = −10.55, c = 0.05, r = 9 and selectk = 7. Then, τ = 1.1271 andτ = 1.3121 (from Equation (16)). Thus, for any triplet (αk −3 , αk −2 , αk −1 ) = (α 4 , α 5 , α 6 ) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1) × (0, 1), we can find a p such that the strategy is to join at queue lengths {0, 1, 2, 3} randomize at {4, 5, 6} and balk at {7}. For example, for (α 4 , α 5 , α 6 ) = (0.9, 0.8, 0.7), we have that p = 0.4260. We discuss the knife-edge nature of these equilibria in the following paragraphs.
The equilibrium instance observed in Example 2, with (α 4 , α 5 , α 6 ) = (0.9, 0.8.0.7) generates a 'non-classical' equilibrium queue-joining behavior with randomization probabilities that are monotone decreasing over three consecutive queue lengths. One may anticipate the large prevalence of this monotone queue-joining equilibrium. Nevertheless, such equilibria with multiple queue lengths with randomization rely on knife-edge conditions and therefore will disappear under small perturbation of the parameters. The condition under which such equilibria with three consecutive randomization states (such as Example 2) exist is a knife-edge condition; Equation (16): A small perturbation of (τ ,τ ) will break the equality φ(k − 3) = φ(k − 2) = φ(k − 1) and therefore, the randomization at queue lengths {k − 3,k − 2,k − 1} for p 1−p Φ ′ (α * ) also breaks down. Therefore, equilibria with randomization at three queue lengths (including those equilibria that impose mono-tone queue joining, such as in Example 2) are in fact less prevalent than the ones with sputtering at a single queue length.
Thus, we have demonstrated that the sputtering equilibrium with randomization at a single queue length strictly below the balking threshold is not a peculiar equilibrium, but quite prevalent.
The Impact of an Unknown State of the World
We now explore the effect of unknown service value in consumers' prior distribution on the firm's throughput. In the case when the consumers know a firm's service value and time exactly, the Naor threshold is ⌊ V 0 +rτ cτ ⌋ , which immediately determines the joining rate,
We address the throughput in the full-information case as
compare it to the throughput in our case, TP * (τ ) = {1 − π 0 (α * , τ )}/τ , when the expected service time is unknown.
Example 1 (contd.): In Table 1 , we tabulate the impact of the information about the service value, or the lack thereof, on the firm's throughput.
Unknown τ , ω = * 0.6981 0.5686 0.6722 Full Information τ , ω =i 0.0000 0.9722 0.7777 Notice that the throughput is zero when consumers know the mean service time and value (when τ = τ ) which follows from Assumption (1). Interestingly, the low-value firm (with faster service rate) cannot attract any consumers if its type is fully known. However, when there is uncertainty about the firm's type, it free rides using the existence of a high-value firm. The high-value firm may suffer from the "empty restaurant" syndrome: Its throughput is lower when the expected service time is unobserved, compared to the case when its expected service time is observed. This observation is a direct result of the sputtering equilibrium. The randomization at short queue lengths slows down the queue joining at that queue length, which, via Equation (4), reduces the probability at all longer queue lengths. For instance, sputtering occurs at queue length of 1 in Example 1, and fewer consumers join the queue in that, and all higher queue lengths. This lower joining rate consequently inhibits the growth of long queues, leading eventually to reduced throughput. Thus, revealing the expected service times and service values ex ante affects the throughput.
Continuous Priors on Expected Service Time
In section 3, we found that for bivalued expected service times, an equilibrium with randomization at a single queue length (at most) always exists (as identified in Proposition 3), except for knife-edge cases. It is natural to ask if the results for the bi-valued state of the world (τ ∈ {τ ,τ }) is sustained for a continuous state of the world (τ ∈ [τ ,τ ]). We address this question by using a two-step approach. First, in order to derive results and insights into the structure of such equilibria, we devise in section 4.1 a simple iterative algorithm that allows us to numerically compute an approximation of the equilibrium involving randomization, with arbitrarily precision (at the expense of computing time). In section 4.2, we discuss the impact of imperfect information on the throughput. Then, using a representative example generated through the algorithm as an illustration, we derive the analytical properties of densities (beliefs) that support a specific sputtering equilibrium structure in section 4.3.
We consider a continuously distributed prior over both value and expected service time with distribution (density) X(τ ) (x(τ )). We use V (τ ) to denote the expected service value conditioned on the expected service time. As before, we assume that V ( 
We can write the utility, u (n, γ), when γ of Equation (17) is substituted in Equation (3) as a function of α, U (n, α):
. Now, we generalize our results on sputtering equilibria for bivalued distributions of the service times to the case when consumers have continuous prior distributions. To this effect, we ask the following question: Given any density, x(τ ), what would be the corresponding equilibrium strategy α * ? In order to obtain insights in the structure of the equilibrium joining strategy for any such distribution, we resort to the construction of the equilibrium through an iterative algorithm in section 4.1.
An Algorithm for Computing an Equilibrium in Continuous Priors
It is easy to see that an equilibrium exists under our prescribed conditions. Recall that our objective is more specific: We seek whether an equilibrium in which players randomize at some queue length and join with probability one at a longer queue can exist. Computational literature has shown that, in general, the problem of identifying Nash equilibria with a specific desired structure, belongs to a class of NP-hard problems (see Gilboa and Zemel, 1989) . Establishing computational complexity for our specific problem structure is beyond the scope of our work. It is possible that for most instances of our problem, we can find a numerically acceptable equilibrium efficiently.
Therefore, we focus on numerically establishing an equilibrium with arbitrarily close numerical approximations on payoffs. In order to achieve this objective, we have to resort to either analyzing small problems or locating equilibria by introducing some "tolerance" on payoffs-a tolerance limit that is numerically dictated by the number of computational iterations of the problem instance.
To begin, we smooth the discontinuous equilibrium conditions of Equation (7) 
Then we solve a sequence of optimization problems for β ∈ {β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β T } and β 1 < β 2 < · · · < β T . Note that for β = 0, H(u, β) = 1/2 for any α. We use α n = 1/2 as the initial point of the lowest value, β 1 . Next, we useα β 1 as the initial point for the minimization with parameter β 2 .
We use the solutionα β 2 as initial point for the minimization problem with β 3 and so on. Besides rounding errors and errors of numerically computing the integrals in the objective function, β T , the value of the objective function (F (α β T , β T )) and the value of β T determines how close the solution
Hence, in selecting an upper bound, ε F , on F (α β T ,β T ) < ε F , we ensure that the best response to strategyα β T is arbitrarily close to α * by selecting a high value for β T . Take for example, ϵ = 5/β T , we obtain δ = H(−5/β T , β T ) = 1/(1 + e 5 ) = 0.0066 and H(5/β T , β T ) = 1/(1 + e −5 ) = 0.9933 ≈ 1 − δ. Therefore, when terminating with β T = 2,000, every strictly negative utility less than −5/β T = −0.0025 will be mapped in a joining probability in [0, 0.0066] (which can stipulated to be an arbitrarily small interval close to zero) and every strictly positive utility Therefore, higher values of β T makeα β T closer to α * (at the expense of computational time).
Using an example generated by the algorithm, we examine the generalization of a sputtering equilibrium for continuous beliefs. More specifically, we will identify an equilibrium in which there is randomization of the joining-balking decision at two different queue lengths. We will use this illustrative example in section 4.3, as we derive results on beliefs that generate such equilibria. Figure 4 , it follows that there is no pure threshold joining strategy. In the middle panel, we plot the computed equilibrium joining strategy. In the right most panel, we plot the corresponding equilibrium value and waiting cost. Notice that there are two queue lengths at which there is randomization. (At these two points, the waiting cost and the equilibrium service value coincide.)
At the empty queue, the joining probability, α * 0 = 0.8472. At queue length n = 5, the joining probability is α * 5 = 0.1884. At queue-lengths n ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, an arriving consumer joins always. At queue length n = 6, the consumer balks. In our computational approach, we demonstrate this equilibrium by starting at β 1 = 1/4 and ending at β 15 = 2,000, with tolerance ε F = 10 −4 and obtained F (α β T , β T ) = 1.4662 × 10 −9 to locate this equilibrium.
The Impact of an Unknown Service Rate and Value
We investigate the impact of the absence of information on the true expected service time and value, as done in section 3.4. The throughput for this case, when the consumers are fully informed
Figure 5: Comparison of throughputs under perfect (solid line) vs. imperfect (dashed line) information on service rate. The left panel is for Example 3, and the right panel is for Example 4.
where the joining probabilities are prescribed by the Naor threshold:
. We need to compare the throughput under full information with
Example 3 (contd.):
We compare the throughputs under the cases of perfect and imperfect information, and find TP i = 0.6754 and TP * = 0.8289. Note that the lack of information on the expected service time under continuous priors may increase the total throughput on average.
The low-value service provider thrives by free riding on the reputation of the high-value service providers. Of course, just as discussed in section 3.4, the high-value service provider does suffer from the empty-restaurant effect. However, in this instance, the slowing down due to the randomization at low queue lengths does not significantly hurt the high-value service provider's throughput. The reason is that the arrival rate is relatively high compared to the mean service time (recall that Λ = 2 and the highest value service provider has a service rate of 1/τ = 0.51282), hence, not many consumers are lost through balking at the sputtering queue length (n = 0). This effect is demonstrated in Figure 5 , left panel. Under imperfect information, the equilibrium joining strategy is to randomize with probability 0.0804 at the empty queue, join all other queues less than 4 and balk at 5. Due to the low joining probability at the empty queue, the low-value firm does not gain significantly when free-riding. We have TP i = 0.5435 and TP * = 0.5301. This effect is demonstrated in Figure 5 , right panel.
Using the previous example as a specific characterization, we analytically explore what prior beliefs could sustain sputtering equilibria and provide further analytical results.
Continuous Prior Beliefs that Support a Sputtering Equilibrium
In the previous section that we addressed the question: For a given density, x(τ ), what is an equilibrium strategy α * ? In the light of the results on sputtering equilibrium in the case of a bivalued distribution on priors, we check if such sputtering equilibria could be sustained on continuous beliefs.
Hence, it is pertinent to ask: For a given joining strategy, α * which densities, x(τ ), support α * ?
In particular, we are interested in characterizing the probability distributions over the interval [τ ,τ ] (or its subintervals), that can support some equilibrium structure α * . Several such distributions may exist. Therefore, we explore a criterion for choosing prior probability distributions, on the basis of partial information (such as support of the distribution), that leads to a certain equilibrium inference. In order to establish this criterion, we obtain an alternative condition for the expected utility at queue length n to be positive:
where
and τ (n) = V 0 /(−r + c(n + 1)), n ∈ {0, . . . ,N }. Note A n (τ, α) depends on service time τ , which is a random variable with distribution X(τ ), and the consumer joining strategy α. A n helps us isolate the impact of the mean service time on joining utilities. Equation (18) states that when the expected value of A n (τ, α) is positive, the expected utility from joining the queue is positive.
τ (n) is the mean service time above which the expected net utility of joining a queue of length n becomes positive. With Assumption 1 and the definition ofN , it can be seen that τ (n) is increasing in queue length n and lies in the interval [τ ,τ ] for n ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1} (i.e., for all joining states).
Thus, we have
. We obtain the equilibrium condition expressed uniquely in terms of α * :
As one might expect, the continuous distribution of prior beliefs poses additional technical constraints. For instance, under continuous distribution of prior beliefs, we cannot readily decompose the condition U (n, α) 0 into two separable terms of φ and p 1−p Φ as in Equation (8) even when α is a threshold strategy. Therefore, characterizing a sputtering equilibrium is involved as it requires solving a fixed-point problem along with a set of nonlinear equations at those queue lengths at which randomization might occur, and also a set of inequalities (at the other queue lengths) involving the integrals ∫τ τ A n (τ, α)dX(τ ), for n ∈ {0, · · · ,N }.
As A n (τ, α) is a ratio of polynomials in τ , no closed form of the integral exists for any general density function. Nevertheless, we can characterize some prior distributions that support the existence of sputtering equilibria.
Let us now revisit the structure of our equilibrium. Let k be the lowest queue length at which α * (n) = 0. Recall that, without loss of generality, we can restrict our analysis to the subset of queue lengths since those longer than k are reached with zero probability in equilibrium and hence can be ignored. Let N {0, 1, . . . , k} be the set of recurrent queue lengths for α * . We then partition
For notational convenience, we drop α * from all arguments. (In particular, we write A n (τ, α * ) as simply, A n (τ ).) With this notation, we can write the equilibrium conditions of Equation (7) as
Clearly, many density functions may satisfy Equation (19) and hence, support α * . We can now characterize specific density functions that allow the equilibrium constraints to hold. In order to exploit the linear structure of Equation (19), we identify among all density functions that satisfy Equation (19) the function with the minimal maximum density value. We allow all density functions, x(τ ), in the space of Lebesgue integrable functions over [τ ,τ ] , that are bounded under the
Hence, all inequalities will hold 'a.e.' (i.e. they must hold almost everywhere, except at those subsets with Lebesgue measure zero) and the maximum value of x(τ ) be denoted by
a.e.} or x 0 x(τ ), a.e., in short). Minimizing the maximum of the density can be achieved via a linear objective function and adding (an infinite number of) linear constraints. Note that now all constraints and the objective function are linear in (x(τ ), τ ∈ [τ ,τ ]). We obtain the following infinite-dimensional linear program: a.e. and (19) . (20) We refer to the problem of finding the distribution with minimum maximal density over all continuous distributions in Equation (20) as the min-max density problem and its solution (i.e., the continuous distribution with the minimum maximum density on its support) as the min-max density (that supports the equilibrium structure α * ). Note that this criterion spreads the uncertainty on service times over [τ ,τ ] . Specifically, if we were to solve the unconstrained min-max density problem choosing from all probability distributions over the finite support [τ ,τ ] , the solution results in a uniform distribution implying that the consumer beliefs that all (mean) service times in the interval [τ ,τ ] are equally likely.
Preview of the results:
In Proposition 6, we find that the min-max density is a piecewise uniform density that is fully characterized by its support, T * ⊆ [τ ,τ ] . We establish this finding by solving the dual and showing that its optimal solution is feasible for the primal. We illustrate our findings via two numerical examples. In the first example, we identify the min-max density of an equilibrium with randomization at a single queue length. We find (i) that the support is not compact and (ii) the expected utility under the min-max density at a queue length with pure joining is zero. In the second example, we identify the min-max density of an equilibrium with randomization at two queue lengths. We find (i) that the min-max density has a compact support and (ii) the expected utility under the min-max density is zero at the two queue lengths with randomization and non-zero elsewhere.
To begin, we assume that α * is an equilibrium for some prior distribution to ensure that Equation (19) has at least one feasible solution. The dual of Problem (20) is:
where δ − (n) = 1 if n ∈ N − and 0 otherwise. w ∈ R, the dual variable associated with the integrality constraint in Equation (19), is unrestricted in sign. w n for n ∈ N are the dual variables of the utility constraints at each queue length with a pure joining strategy (join or balk), and hence, need to be nonnegative for n ∈ N + ∪ N − and are unrestricted in sign for n ∈ N 0 . Finally, the τ ] ) is the dual to the constraints x(τ ) x 0 , a.e.
For convenience of notation, define the set in which the dual variables associated with the expected utility constraints (the first three constraints of Equation (19)) to be W = {w ∈ R k and w n 0 for n ∈ N + ∪ N − } and the optimization problem of Equation (22), given w ∈ W (over w and w 0 (τ )):
s.t. conditions (21) evaluated at w ∈ W.
Then, the dual problem, (D), can be written as sup w∈W D(w). In Appendix, we provide an analytical expression for D(w) that allows us to obtain conditions for w * .
Proposition 6. (i) For any finite w ∈ W (i.e. ∥w∥ < +∞, where ∥·∥ is any norm in
is the unique solution of
and D(w) is continuously differentiable with respect to w.
0} be the set where the integrand of Equation (23) is non-negative. Then, the optimal solution to the primal problem, (P), of Equation (20) is:
is a piece-wise uniform density. Proposition 6(i) reveals the structure of the solution of the dual, (D). Assume that a finite
and, of course: w * = D(w * )). Thus, the dual solution w * 0 (τ ) has the following interesting feature: Either the first constraint of the dual is binding (a.e.), or, the third, non-negativity constraint, is binding (a.e.) (see Equation (21)). As a consequence of the complementary slackness conditions (see Appendix, Equation (30)), it follows that in the primal domain, x * (τ ) (when w * is finite) will either be equal to zero (when w * 0 (τ ) > 0), or be equal to
. In other words, the structure of the dual solution implies that the solution to the primal must be a piecewise uniform density, which is is fully specified by its support, T * . In Proposition 6(ii), we prove that the piecewise uniform density is also feasible in the primal domain, and hence, optimal. We interpret these conditions in terms of our queuing game. Let E τ [f (τ )|T ] stand for the expected value of f (τ ), when τ is a piecewise uniformly distributed random variable with support
. In Appendix (Lemma 8), we show that the partial derivative of D(w) with respect to w n for n ∈ N , evaluated at a finite w ∈ W is:
As D(w) is continuously differentiable and the constraint set W is linear, we check the KarushKuhn-Tucker (KKT) for optimality of w * in the dual problem, (D):
Recall from Equation (18) that sign of the expected utility at any queue length n is the same as the sign of ∫τ τ A n (τ )dX(τ ). Assuming that the expected service time has a piecewise uniform density, according to the optimality conditions of Equation (24), the optimal support, T * = T (w * ), must be such that the expected utility at queue lengths in N + (N − , N 0 ) is non-negative (nonpositive, zero). Hence, this piecewise uniform density is also feasible in the primal domain. In other words, the duality gap is zero; D(w * ) = x * 0 = 1/ ∫ τ ∈T * 1dτ and we have characterized the optimal primal solution. The support of the expected service time, T * , must be 'supported' by dual variables (in W) as follows: An expected service time τ ∈ [τ ,τ ] belongs to the support if and only
0. This is interesting because there is no guarantee that this support is compact. Solving sup w∈W D(w), i.e. finding w * that satisfy Equation (24) is still a non-trivial problem. We obtain additional insights by imposing more structure on W. We now demonstrate below we can use the conditions of Equation (24) and Proposition 6 to identify min-max densities supporting a certain joining strategy profile. We illustrate this with the following examples.
Example 1 (contd.): We compute the min-max density probability distribution among the family of distributions that support the equilibrium, α * , observed in Example 1, with sputtering at a single queue length, k = 1 (with randomization α 1 = 0.1695), balking atk = 6, and joining with probability 1 at all other queue lengths. That is, N 0 = {1}. With Proposition 6, we obtain that the support of the min-max density is 
2 ) 0 (Proposition 6(ii)) is satisfied. We also verify that the piecewise uniform distribution characterized by T * is feasible in the primal domain. Thus, the support of the min-max density is not compact. Moreover, as w * 0 ̸ = 0 and w * 2 ̸ = 0, the utility at n = 1 and n = 2 is equal to zero, even though randomization only occurs in α * at n = 1. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that when we use continuously distributed priors instead of the simple bivalued priors, randomization at multiple queue lengths can exist.
To illustrate this point, we use Proposition 6 to find the min-max density that supports α ′ * , close (in the Euclidean space) to α * , only, at n = k ′ = 2, the joining probability is 0.95 instead of 1 (for α * ). Thus, α ′ * = (1, 0.1695, 0.95, 1, 1, 1, 0) (compared with α * = (1, 0.1695, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0)). Even though α ′ * is close to α * , notice that it is structurally very different because now, N ′0 = {1, 2}(̸ = N 0 ). We find that the support of the min-max density supporting α ′ * is T ′ * = [0.65, 0.69787] ∪ [1.54100, 1.55], which is very close to T * . Therefore, α ′ * , which involves randomization at two queue lengths, is an equilibrium under a continuous (piecewise uniform) density with support T ′ * .
The example above emphasizes our main observation for continuous prior distributions: Equilibria with randomization at more than two queue lengths can be supported.
Now consider the equilibrium of Example 3.
Example 3 (contd.): Recall that with the Beta-distributed prior (with symmetric parameters 1.5). The equilibrium joining strategy had randomization at two queue lengths; N 0 = {0, 5} and balking at N − = {6}. At all other queue lengths, the equilibrium is to join with probability 1.
With Proposition 6, we verify whether T * of the form [τ * 1 , τ * 2 ] is optimal. With Equation (24), we obtain two conditions for τ * 1 and τ * 2 :
We solve for τ * 1 = 0.4414 and τ * 2 = 1.8451 and verify that we can find two dual variables such
). This is achieved by:
w * 0 = 0.5260 and w * 5 = −0.4966. Finally, we also verify that the piecewise uniform distribution characterized by T * is feasible in the primal domain. For this example, the min-max density is a compact uniform distribution over [τ * 1 , τ * 2 ] under which the expected utility is zero at randomization queue lenghts only (n = 0 and n = 5) and non-zero at other queue lengths.
Hence through these two illustrative examples, we have shown that continuous prior distributions can give rise to randomization-in fact, there could be randomization at multiple queue lengths. Thus, in conclusion, our results on sputtering equilibrium are robust and fundamentally expand the threshold equilibria considered in Naor (1969) for cases with informational uncertainties.
Conclusions
Beginning with the seminal paper by Naor (1969) , queueing literature has generally focused on threshold queue-joining policies. We find that a focus on simple threshold policies in queuing games with uncertainty is restrictive. Perhaps, the overwhelming reason to employ such threshold structure is its theoretical simplicity: the joining rate is monotonically decreasing in the queue lengths, i.e., fewer customers join longer queues. However, in practice, it appears that equilibrium queue-joining behaviors may not be monotonic (for e.g., see Olivares et al. 2012) . In our paper, we have provided a "classical" explanation for such non-threshold joining equilibria, by specifying consumers as perfectly rational Bayesian agents.
We show that when the expected service value and expected service time are unknown to the consumers, but positively correlated, the equilibrium structure cannot be fully characterized by means of threshold policies. Due to the positive correlation between service value and time, the updated value from a service in fact increases in the length of the queue. Long queues also imply long waiting times. Hence, both waiting costs and service value increase in queue lengths. A simple threshold queue-joining strategy is not always an equilibrium.
We find that equilibrium structure involves non-monotone queue joining, which we characterize as a sputtering equilibrium. When the service values and time are perfectly known, or when the difference between the service times of high-and low-quality service firms is small, we recover the classical threshold strategy. When the difference in expected service times is large enough, a sputtering equilibrium involving randomization at one or more queue lengths may emerge.
We show that randomization at a single queue length arises when the prior about the service time and value is "peaked": Either both are high, or both are low. Moreover, such sputtering equilibria is persistent, and is present even when other equilibria fail to exist. When the prior about the expected service time and value are more uniformly distributed over some interval, randomization at multiple queue lengths may occur. Hence, irrespective of the nature of the prior distribution, pure threshold queue-joining strategies are not always an equilibrium.
We hope that this paper will provide a scientific foundation for the recent empirical evidence suggesting that non-monotonic queue joining may arise in practice, and spur more operations research theorists and behavioral researchers studying queue-joining behavior, analytically, empirically or through laboratory experiments.
There is increasing evidence in the behavioral and experimental literature, that in real life, consumers may not always be rational, apply queuing theory or Bayes' rule correctly. Our model with rational Bayesian agents is a compelling benchmark against which behavioral deviations in queue-joining behavior may be compared, just as Naor's model has provided the current literature with a benchmark.
Our model also provides predictions for laboratory queue-joining experiments or empirical tests when the expected service time and value are not fully known to the consumers. For instance, Kremer and Debo (2011) test behavioral deviations from pure threshold joining strategies in a laboratory environment in which some subjects perfectly know the service value.
More analytical work may be required to incorporate behavioral deviations from rational queuejoining predictions. For example, Huang et al. (2012) analyze a model with random queue-joining choice errors, assuming that all parameter values are known to consumers. Modeling such behavioral deviations observed in laboratory environments when all parameters are not known perfectly is also an interesting line of further research. Ultimately, we hope that understanding consumer queuejoining or queue-avoidance behavior will allow service firms to manage revenues and profits better, while meeting consumer expectations.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2: Let ρ = Λτ andρ = Λτ , where ρ <ρ. Now, we considerk as a continuous variable.
(i) To prove Φ(k) is monotonically decreasing ink, we first write Φ (k) as
and determine
= ak +1 ln a and
1−ρ > 0 (the sum of ρ j is positive as ρ > 0), we simplify to obtain:
Hence, we can write the condition that Φ(k) is decreasing as
Now, we argue that
−ρk +1 ln ρ 1−ρk +1 is strictly increasing in ρ. Hence, the above inequality holds. Let z = ρk +1 , and notice that
and, as −z ln(z) 1−z > 0 and is continuously increasing for all z > 0 and z = ρk +1 is monotonic in ρ,
(ii) Proof that φ(ñ) is monotonic inñ when C > 0: We considerñ as a continuous variable and derive φ (ñ) over an extended domain, (n,n), with n = (V 0 +rτ )/(cτ )−1 andn = (V 0 +rτ )/(cτ )−1 (and, via Assumption 1, n < 0 <n). Then, we can write φ (ñ) as
Notice that φ(n) = 0 and limñ →n+ φ(ñ) = +∞ and φ(ñ) > 0 forñ ∈ (n,n). Next, we prove that over (n,n), the derivative can have zero, one or two roots. We ignore the knife-edge case of one root. Now, we take the derivative:
it follows that dφ(ñ) dñ > 0 for allñ ∈ (n,n). In that case, φ(ñ) is monotonically increasing over n ∈ (n,n). The right-hand side of Equation (25) is quadratic inñ with a maximum atñ o =n +n 2 . Hence, dφ(ñ) dñ = 0 has zero or two (real) roots, depending on whether the maximum of the right-hand side exceeds the left-hand side or not. Substitutingñ o in Equation (25), we obtain that
or, after dividing byn − n (which is strictly positive) and multiplying by c (> 0):
We have thus proven that when C > 0, φ(ñ) is increasing for allñ ∈ (n,n).
When C < 0, there exist two roots of Equation (25), which, as φ(ñ) is increasing in the neighborhood of n, correspond with a local maximum (lowest root) and minimum (highest root)
respectively.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Recall that we have a condition for the sign of the expected utility of a randomly arriving consumer at queue length n, when all other consumers join according to α; U (n, α). At queue length n, when α is a pure joining strategy characterized by balking at queue length n, we can write
For convenience of notation, we relabel p/(1 − p) as l 0 . Recall from Proposition 2(i) that l 0 Φ(k) is monotonically decreasing ink. Also, by definition of n andn, have φ(n) = 0 < φ(n) = +∞. Recall also from its definition that ⌈N (k)⌉ = m is the lowest non-negative (integer) queue length such that φ(m) Φ(k). Generalizing the joining strategy α to one with randomization with probability α k at k and balking atk, it is easy to see that the condition to join becomes
at queue length n. We will use these properties below.
Consider the sequence {φ(n) : n = ⌈n⌉, . . . , ⌈n⌉}. For notational convenience, we set φ(⌈n⌉) = +∞. We consider two cases: If φ(n) is monotonically increasing in n, we examine case (i). If not, we examine case (ii).
Case (i):
If φ(ñ) is monotonically increasing in n (when C > 0), this means that there must exist
Depending on φ(k − 1) and l 0 Φ(k), we consider two subcases:
, then, k characterizes a pure balking equilibrium strategy (as k is the lowest queue length for which
, then, we can always construct an equilibrium with randomization at k − 1 and balking at k as follows. Recall that from the definition of k, φ(k − 1) < l 0 Φ(k − 1). If now we also have l 0 Φ(k) < φ(k − 1), combining these two inequalities, it follows that
Hence, from the definition of Φ(·), we recognize:
Substituting these in Equation (26), we obtain
Hence, by continuity ofΦ(k − 1, α, k) in α, there exists some
, or consumers mix between joining and balking at k − 1. As φ(n) is increasing,
consumers join at 0 n < k − 1. This establishes the "classical" mixing threshold equilibrium at k = k − 1 (with probability α k−1 ) and balking atk = k = k + 1.
Case (ii): If φ(ñ)
is not monotonically increasing inñ (when C < 0), in what comes next, we identify two queue lengths, k andk, at which it will be rational to respectively randomize and balk.
φ(n) is not monotone and has a local maximum and a local minimum. k andk will be identified by 'ironing' φ(n) , that is: Replacing the non-monotone φ(n) by φ ′ (n), which is monotone (nondecreasing). In particular, we will 'fill the trough' caused by the local minimum. Then, φ ′ (n) will have a unique intersection with Φ(n). Based on this, we will prove that there exist a randomization probability, α 0 , at k that makes the consumer indifferent at k, balk atk and join at all other queue lengths less than or equal tok.
Let k be the local maximum of φ(n) over n = ⌈n⌉, . . . , ⌈n⌉ (the lowest root, identified in the proof of Proposition 2(ii)) and definek as the lowest queue length with a value that is strictly more
Note that, by construction, φ(k) > φ(k). Consider the following replacement for the φ(n) sequence.
We replace {φ(n) : n = ⌈n⌉, . . . , ⌈n⌉} with {φ ′ (n) : n = ⌈n⌉, . . . , ⌈n⌉}, where
where 1 A is 1 is A is true and 0 otherwise. In other words, we fill the "trough" in φ(n) with φ(n 0 ).
φ ′ (n) is nondecreasing in n. We illustrate filling the trough with a numerical example.
Illustration of φ ′ (n) via Example 1: For the example, k = 1 is the local maximum and k = 6 is the lowest queue length with φ(n) > φ(1). In Figure 6 , the diamonds indicate φ(n), the circles indicate φ ′ (n). The crosses indicate Φ(n), which is monotonically decreasing. φ ′ (n) is nondecreasing.
The sequence φ ′ (n) is nondecreasing. We use φ ′ (n) instead of φ(n) (as we did for case (i)).
Recall that Φ(k) is decreasing in k. Similarly as in case (i), define k ′ be the lowest k such that
, then, k ′ lies on the increasing part of φ(n) and we recover case (i).
Similarly, if k ′ >n 1 , then we recover case (i). 
in the trough.
Illustration of k ′ via Example 1: In Figure 6 , illustrating Example 1, the crosses indicate Φ(n), which is monotonically decreasing. As φ ′ (n) is nondecreasing, observe that the lowest queue length at which Φ(n) drops below φ ′ (n) is k ′ = 4 and k + 1 = 2 k ′ k = 6.
We have, when k + 1 k ′ k ,
We have now
Hence, we obtained that
We have also
Hence, we have obtained via Equations (28) and (29) that
the consumer arriving at queue length k is indifferent between joining and not. For k < n k − 1,
. Therefore, an arriving, the consumer always joins. Similarly, for 0
is increasing for n k). Hence, the consumer always joins. Finally, for n =k, we have
. Therefore, an arriving consumer always balks.
Thus, we have for all 0 n < k, an arriving consumer joins the queue; at n = k the arriving consumer is indifferent between joining and balking; for k < n k , an arriving consumer joins the queue, and at n =k the arriving consumer balks. Hence, we have a sputtering equilibrium as described in case (ii).
Proof of Proposition 4:
In this proof, we identify sufficient conditions for a sputtering equilibrium with k = 0 andk > 1, where k andk are defined in Proposition 3. When k = 0 < 1 <k, if a mixed strategy exists, it is non-monotone (as there is randomization at the empty queue, joining with probability one when the queue length is one or more, and balking at queue lengthk). Then, we show that when k = 0 < 1 <k, there exists always a non-empty interval of prior probabilities, [p,p] , such that when the prior is within such interval, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
Recall that from Proposition 2 that when C < 0, φ(ñ) = ( τ τ )ñ +1ñ −n n−ñ has a local maximum (N 0 ) followed by a local minimum (
and corresponds with the local maximum (local minimum). Hence, when N 0 is negative, φ(ñ) achieves a local minimum over [0,n) . For convenience of notation, let
) with n < 0 <n. Recall that the lowest root is always less than 1 2 (n +n). The lowest root is negative when 1 2 (n +n) < 0 or when n +n > 0 andn + n <
. We can square both sides of the last inequality and obtain the following condition: 4nn
1 n − 1 n +X X < 0. Asnn < 0 and X > 0, the latter inequality
Expressed in terms of the primitives of our model (recall from the text that n = (V 0 + rτ )/(cτ ) − 1 andn = (V 0 + rτ )/(cτ ) − 1), the lowest root, N 0 , is negative when
Hence, when the condition above is satisfied, from Proposition 3, if a mixed strategy exists, mixing will occur at k = 0. From Proposition 3, if a mixed strategy exists, the balking threshold will be atk = min{n ∈ N, n > 0 and φ(n) > φ(0)}. Now, let N 1 (> 0) be the solution of φ(N 1 ) = φ(0).
As limñ →n φ(ñ) = +∞, such N 1 always exists. With Proposition 2, N 1 is also unique. It follows
there is a 'trough' in between k andk. As φ(N 1 ) = φ(0) and φ(ñ) achieves a local minimum over [0,n), it must be the case that N 1 is strictly higher than the local minimum, N ′ 0 , which is 1 2 (n+ n+
). Therefore, ask > N 1 > N ′ 0 and a sufficient condition fork > 1 is that N ′ 0 > 1. Recall that the highest root is always more than 1 2 (n +n). When
is for sure greater than one. When
On squaring, we have when
Expressed in terms of the primitives of our model:
Now, we can prove:
then, for any p ∈ (p,p), k ′ , as defined in the proof of Proposition 3, i.e. the lowest k such that
and Φ(k) is decreasing in k, see Proposition 2(i)). Ask > 1, a sputtering equilibrium can always be found.
(ii) When p ∈ (p,p), the only candidate for a pure strategy or classical mixed strategy is a k that satisfies: l 0 Φ(k) < φ(k) and φ(k − 1) < l 0 Φ(k − 1). Any intersection of l 0 Φ(k) over [1, ...,k − 1] will be such that φ(0) > l 0 Φ(k) in case of a pure strategy, hence, joining at the empty queue cannot be rational. Similarly, any randomized strategy at k ′ ∈ {1, ...,k − 1} will have
, hence, joining at the empty queue cannot be rational. Similarly, for any randomized strategies at multiple queue lengths in {1, ...,k − 1}, joining at the empty queue cannot be rational. Therefore, the only randomized strategy is at k = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5: (i) A necessary condition for a randomization strategy is with randomization at queue length k is that U (k, α) = 0, or via Equation (8) ,τ ) ). From Proposition 2, φ(ñ) has a local maximum followed by a local minimum, starting at 0 and going to ∞, so, at most, we can have three intersection points with any p 1−p Φ(α). Hence, there cannot be any randomization strategy at more than four queue lengths.
(ii) Now, we obtain conditions for mixed strategies at three consecutive queue lengths, say {k − 3,k − 2,k − 1}, followed by balking atk. To that end, we need to identify parameters such that φ(n) < φ(k − 3) = φ(k − 2) = φ(k − 1) < φ(k) for 0 n <k − 3. The proof proceeds in three steps.
First, we find conditions under which the roots of dφ(ñ) dñ = 0 are close to an integer;k −2 (the middle queue length at which there is randomization). When the local minimum and maximum of φ (ñ) are arbitrarily close to some integer, φ (n) will be increasing over {0, ...,k − 3} and over {k − 1, ...}.
Second, we only need to make φ(k − 3) = φ(k − 2) = φ(k − 1). Third, we find values of the prior, p, such that for any given randomization triplet, (αk −3 , αk −2 , αk −1 ) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1) × (0, 1) in strategy profile α, we obtain U (α, n) > 0 for n ∈ {0, ...,k − 2}, U (α, n) = 0 for n ∈ {k − 3,k − 2,k − 1} and over U (α,k) < 0, or, with Equation (8) Then, when c is small enough, c can be negative and close to zero, therefore, with X = − ln( τ τ ), the two roots defined by N 0 and N ′ 0 be the roots of Step 2: Second, we evaluate φ(ñ) atk − 3,k − 2 andk − 1 and impose conditions on (τ ,τ ) that φ(k − 3) = φ(k − 2) = φ(k − 1). As φ(ñ) is increasing below N 0 and above N ′ 0 , we know that φ(n) < φ(k − 3) for 0 n k − 4, hence, in equilibrium it will be rational to join queues over {0, ...,k − 4}, randomize at {k − 3,k − 2,k − 1} and balk atk. Now, we characterize (τ ,τ ): Asx <ŷ < 0, we have that 0 < τ <τ . Thus, we obtained: 0 n k − 4: φ(n) < φ(k − 3) = φ(k − 2) = φ(k − 1) < φ(k).
Step 3: For any given triplet (αk −3 , αk −2 , αk −1 ) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1) × (0, 1), we still need to ensure that at queue lengths n ∈ {k − 3,k − 2,k − 1}: φ(n) =Φ(αk We can always find a p ∈ (0, 1) such that φ(k) = .
show that when the KKT conditions hold, the identified solution is feasible in the primal domain.
Hence, the duality gap is zero and the identified primal solution is optimal in the primal domain. 
Proof of Lemma 7
For any bounded w ∈ R k , we identify a bounded, continuous function that solves Equation (22). Let w * 0 (τ, w) ∈ C ([τ ,τ ] ), which is the set of continuous functions defined over [τ ,τ ] and w * k+1 (w) ∈ R be the solutions for D(w). For convenience of notation, we drop the argument w in this proof.
We argue that w * k+1 and w * 0 (τ ) must be such that the second constraint in (21) must be binding, ∫τ τ w * 0 (τ )dτ = 1, and either the first, or, the fourth constraint must also be binding; w * 0 (τ ) = { ∑ k n=1 w n A n (τ ) + w * k+1 } + . Fix (w k+1 , w 0 (τ )), satisfying { ∑ k n=1 w n A n (τ ) + w k+1 } + w 0 (τ ) for all τ ∈ [τ ,τ ], i.e. (w k+1 , w 0 (τ )) is feasible for (21).
Step 1: Suppose that ∫τ τ w 0 (τ )dτ < 1, then, the objective function can be increased by increasing w k+1 by adding the amount ∆ = These satisfy the constraints (21). The objective function value of w * k+1 cannot be improved further without violating constraints (21). As A n (τ ) is continuous and bounded over [τ ,τ ] , w * 0 (τ ) ∈ C ([τ ,τ ] ), no function in L ∞ ([τ ,τ ] ) that differs from w * 0 (τ ) on a measurable set could be feasible and improve on w * 0 (τ is the expected value of A n (τ ) when τ is a piecewise uniformly distributed random variable with density x * (τ ). Recall that the primal constraints impose that for n ∈ {1, ..., m}, ∫ τ ∈T * A n (τ )dτ 0 and for n ∈ {m + 1, . . . , k}, ∫ τ ∈T * A n (τ )dτ = 0. Thus the KKT conditions state guarantee primal feasibility. Thus, x * 0 and x * (τ ) are feasible in the primal domain, hence, x * (τ ) is the optimal solution of (P).
Proofs of Lemma 7, 8 and 9 complete the proof of Proposition 6.
